In 2️ years:

The U.N. ban on Iranian arms exports and imports will lift.

Meaning ➡ Iran can freely build up its military and fuel regional conflicts through the support of its terrorist proxies.

In 5️ years:

U.N. ban on assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program will end.

Meaning ➡ Iran, whose ballistic missiles already threaten Israel and parts of Europe, will have a much easier path to acquire missile components and technology.

In 5️ years:

The ban on the manufacture of advanced centrifuges will begin to expire.

Meaning ➡ Iran will be able to reduce its nuclear weapon breakout time by perfecting rapid manufacture of advanced centrifuges.

In 5️ years:

Assuming congressional approval, U.S. nuclear sanctions will lift.

Meaning ➡ The deal calls on the president to seek a congressional repeal of nuclear sanctions legislation.  

In 7️ years:

Snapback provision embedded in expiring U.N. resolution will terminate.

Meaning ➡ New sanctions would require passage of another UNSC resolution, which Russia and China could veto.  

In 8️ years:

The cap of 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz facility will lift.

Meaning ➡ More centrifuges will allow faster uranium enrichment and facilitate a breakout to a nuclear weapons capability.

In 8️ years:

The ban on replacing IR-1 centrifuges with more advanced models will expire.  

Meaning ➡ Iran’s breakout time will shrink rapidly as it can deploy new, more advanced models. ️

In 8️ years:

Restrictions on centrifuge R&D will end.

Meaning ➡ Iran will be able to perfect its enrichment cycle and streamline its capabilities.

In 1️3️ years:

All nuclear restrictions will lift.

Meaning ➡ All restrictions on the number and type of centrifuges that Iran can manufacture will lift, as well as the number of enrichment facilities and the amount and level of enriched uranium Iran may stockpile.

In 1️3️ years:

Restrictions on heavy water reactors will expire.

In 1️8️ to 2️3️ years:

International access will expire to Iran’s supply chain centrifuge manufacturing and nuclear storage facilities.

Without access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect Iran’s facilities, Iran can more easily set up a secret nuclear program.